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Equity and Admiralty: A Turbulent Path
to Manifest Destiny
George P. Smith, 1*
Effective in 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended "to effect unification of the civil and admiralty procedure."'
With this amendment, the Advisory Committee intended that, "[jiust as
the 1938 rules abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity, this change would abolish the distinction between civil ac-
tions and suits in admiralty."2 Thus, rule 1, defining the scope of the
rules, now states, "These rules govern the procedure in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity or in admiralty. . . .They shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."3
The last sentence of rule 1, with its simple declaration of purpose,
could rightly be viewed as the manifest destiny of the federal rules
themselves. A simple declaration of purpose, however, is not a self-
achieving mechanism. Rather, as regards the unification of civil and
admiralty procedure, the realization of this goal has been fraught with
complexities, turbulence, and dissatisfaction; the destiny may be mani-
fest, but the present state of the law is unclear.
A significant obstacle continues to be the uncertain jurisdictional
issue of whether courts in admiralty may issue equitable decrees. De-
spite the fact that the federal district court system abolished its separate
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University, LL.M., Columbia University; Professor of Law, Catholic
University of America, Washington, D.C. The author acknowledges the research assistance in the
preparation of this article of two former students, Robin Tuttle Waxman and Roy D. Turner.
I FED. R. Civ. P. I advisory committee note.
2 Id. For a general discussion of the effect of the merger of law and equity, see Smith, La
Dolce Vita-Law and Equity Merged at Last!, 24 ARK. L. REV. 162 (1970).
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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admiralty "side" and docket in 1966, and thus made admiralty suits or
libels "civil actions" and applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to them, the consolidated rules still allow for a type of special or differ-
ential treatment to be given cases where admiralty jurisdiction is in fact
invoked.' Once invoked, the traditional reluctance of the courts to
grant admiralty equitable remedial powers arises.
While the amended federal rules do not expressly grant the admi-
ralty courts equity jurisdiction, on their face such an implied grant ex-
ists.' Further, this appears to have been the intended result of the
drafters. Seeking to solidify the 1966 congressional effort toward a
workable unification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
American Law Institute in 1969 took the position that specific provi-
sions affording equitable relief in courts of admiralty should not be
advocated.7 The noble visions of the congressional drafters of the fed-
eral rules and the members of the American Law Institute were not
realized in a number of post-merger cases. While a sentiment devel-
oped that the 1966 unification would simply and effectively resolve the
4 Rule 9(h), entitled "Admiralty and Maritime Claims," states that:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on some other ground may
contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes
of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82 and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims. If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty it is an admiralty or maritime claim for
those purposes whether identified or not. The amendment of pleadings to add or withdraw
an identifying statement is governed by the principles of Rule 15. The reference in title 28,
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), to admiralty cases shall be construed to mean admiralty and maritime
claims within the meaning of this subdivision.
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h).
5 While the amended federal rules do not expressly grant the admiralty courts equity jurisdic-
tion, an argument could be made that such an implicit grant exists. Federal rule 2 directs that
there is but one form of action known as a civil action, FED. R. Civ. P. 2, while rule 9(h) allows for
an admiralty claim to be denominated as such and then subject to the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h). The Supplemental Rules do not
indicate that a maritime claim will be subject to any forms of limited relief. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h)
advisory committee note. Federal rule 65 covers injunctions and provides no language within it
which restricts the availability of injunctive relief in maritime claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. Federal
rule 18(a), allows for joinder of "as many claims, legal, equitable or maritime," as one may have,
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a), and, finally, rule I states that the federal rules govern all civil suits,
"whether cognizable in cases at law or in equity or in admiralty." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Thus, it could
be argued that, taken as a whole, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appear to evince no in-
tent-explicitly or implicitly-to deny federal courts sitting in admiralty the ability to award equi-
table relief.
6 See, e.g., Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After 1966 Uniftcation, 74 MIcH.
L. REv. 1628, 1637 (1976). See also Zobel, Admiralty Jurisdiction, Unification and the American
Law Institute, 6 SAN DIEGO L. R-v. 375 (1969).
7 Robertson, supra note 6, at 1632.
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historical problem of admiralty's lack of basic equitable powers,' and
with at least one authority having observed that the very notion of ad-
miralty's pre-1966 equitable impotence lacked total sense,9 the distinc-
tion persists.' 0
This article will survey pre- and post-unification judicial decisions
on the breadth of equitable powers available to courts in admiralty. By
so doing, it will attempt to glean an understanding of those areas per-
ceived to be problem areas and assess the continued viability and desir-
ability of the restrictions on admiralty courts. The article first explores
the historical origins of the restrictions under the English and early
American legal systems." The article proceeds to describe the judicial
developments during the 20th century which have helped to perpetuate
the distinctions between equity and admiralty under the guise of the
"Schoenamsgruber Doctrine."' 2 Finally, the article describes positive
movements toward the expansion of equitable powers in admiralty by
analyzing the variety of equitable remedies now available to those
courts' 3 and concludes by asserting that the merger under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, if not a mandate to abolish traditional dis-
tinctions, does provide persuasive authority for rapid movement in that
direction.' 4 The restrictions evolved from a misunderstanding of the
English law, and it is time that American courts acknowledge and rem-
edy that fact.
I. VEXATIous BEGINNINGS
In 1340 a High Court of Admiralty was established in England.' 5
Sir Matthew Hale stated that this court's authority was not founded
upon the civil law, "but hath both its Power and Jurisdiction by the
Law of Custom of the Realm, in such matters as are proper for its
Cognizanze.' 6 He specified the grant of jurisdiction as directed to the
arrest of defendants and the attachment of their goods, and then gave
an open-ended resolution that proceedings in admiralty were often-
times outside the scope of civil law rules and were instead guided by
8 See, e.g., Comment, Admiralty Practice After Unfication" Barnacles on the Procedural Hull,
81 YALE LJ. 1154 (1972).
9 Robertson, supra note 6, at 1638.
10 Id. at 1637-45.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 15-51.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 52-82.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 83-232.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 233-49.
15 D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 39 n.41 (1970).
16 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 24 (C. Gray ed. 1971).
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the "ancient laws of Oleron, and other customs introduced by the prac-
tice of the sea."'
17
From the time of the creation of the High Court, strong objections
were made that the powers of the courts of admiralty were being im-
properly exercised. 18 Not only was there jealousy among the common
law courts, the civil-ecclesiastical courts, and between Chancery and
the Privy Council over the establishment of the admiralty courts, but
the "common people of the land" resented interferences with their
every day business by these new maritime courts. 19 Parliament reacted
to these dissatisfactions by passing legislation in 139020 and in 139221
which was designed basically to delineate the scope of admiralty juris-
diction as between those actions undertaken within the realm and those
done outside it upon the seas.22 Bickering and contention continued
despite the legislation.
23
During the formative years of the American colonies, the status of
admiralty remained in flux. Although an agreement was reached in
1575 between the common law courts and the admiralty judges regard-
ing the practical extent of their respective jurisdictions, 24 Sir Edward
Coke, when he became Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in
1606, undertook a campaign to restrict further admiralty's jurisdic-
tion.25 Admiralty jurisdiction over matters connected with the land
was abolished.26 Interestingly, despite a constant level of strife engen-
dered by the common law judges, the admiralty business in the early
part of the seventeenth century was significant.27 In 1632, Charles I
commissioned his Privy Council to reconcile once and for all the differ-
ences between the admiralty and common law courts. 28 An agreement
largely along the lines of the 1575 one was executed in 1632, which in
reality meant little sustaining progress was again recorded.29 Although
Parliament refused to pass legislation establishing the boundaries of
admiralty jurisdiction in 1661, it also failed to act positively to promote
17 Id; see also generally T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed.
1956); W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1955).
18 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 41.
19 Id. at 40-41.
20 Jurisdiction of admiral and deputy, 13 Rich. II, ch. 5 (1389).
21 Admiralty Jurisdiction, 15 Rich. II, ch. 3 (1391).
22 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 43.
23 See id. at 43-44.
24 Id. at 54.
25 See id. at 55-56.
26 Id. at 56.
27 Id. at 58.




or protect admiralty. Thus, for almost two centuries after this time, the
admiralty court's prominence faded and suffered degeneration.30 Dur-
ing William Scott's (Lord Stowell's) tenure on the High Court of Admi-
ralty which began in 1798, the jurisdiction of the court expanded,
largely through statutory enactments.
31
Over the succeeding years, the process of redefining and reshaping
the boundaries of jurisdiction continued so that at the beginning of the
19th century English admiralty appears to have embraced the following
jurisdictions: civil droits, salvage, contract, hypothecation, freights,
wages, tort, possession and restraint and an all encompassing miscella-
neous grant.32
Confusion in America
When the First Session of the First Congress of the United States
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it established in Section 9 that fed-
eral district courts were to have "exclusive original cognizance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . . saving to suit-
ors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it."' 33 What it did not establish was the extent
of that jurisdiction.
This became a matter of immediate concern to the courts. 34 In
1815, while serving on the Federal Circuit Court, Chief Justice Story
concluded in DeLovio v. Bolt35 that maritime jurisdiction "compre-
hends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch is
necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends over all contracts
(wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the
form of stipulations) which relate to the navigation, business or com-
merce of the sea."3 6
If the Judiciary Act of 1789, as interpreted by the court in
DeLovio, established a separate court of admiralty to entertain suits for
damages for maritime torts or for breach of maritime contracts, did it
also grant that court the power to enjoin the same torts, or to decree
specific performances of the same contract?37 Logically it should have,
30 Id. at 62.
31 F. WISWALL, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE
1800, at 20 (1970).
32 I1d. at 8-11.
33 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976)).
34 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 18-27.
35 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
36 Id. at 444.
37 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 37-40 (2d ed. 1975).
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perhaps, but in 1890 the Supreme Court declared in The Steamer
Eclipse38 that:
While the court of admiralty exercises its jurisdiction upon equitable
principles, it has not the characteristic powers of a court of equity. It
cannot entertain a bill or libel for specific performance, or to correct a
mistake . . . or declare or enforce a trust or an equitable title . . . or
exercise jurisdiction in matters of account merely . . . or decree the sale
of a ship for an unpaid mortgage, or declare her to be the property of the
mortgagees and direct possession of her to be given to them.
39
The immediate questions which demand consideration here are: why
did this inconsistency in jurisdiction and power to remedy equitable
problems arise, and is this still the state of the law today?
It has been stated that the American law of admiralty is the prod-
uct of the general maritime law as it was adapted and molded by prac-
tice. As such, it was not derived from English jurisprudence as was our
common law.4° While this statement does have a sense of validity, it
does not apply uniformly regarding equitable matters. For, in this spe-
cific area of concern, the English maritime law has exerted a profound
degree of influence upon the American courts of admiralty.4
Admiralty courts in Great Britain were relegated early to those
maritime causes over which the common law could not take jurisdic-
tion. Since the law courts made no provision for in rem proceedings,
admiralty assumed total jurisdiction for such causes.42 But common
law forums did have procedural capacity to litigate actions inpersonam
and, as a result, admiralty, with few exceptions, was restrained from
exercising this jurisdiction. 43 Admiralty was allowed to hear actions
for the possession of vessels, but actions to try title to vessels had to be
brought in the law courts.' Thus, admiralty could give protection only
to the legal owners, but could not enforce equitable titles or equitable
claims in the res. In addition, Chancery had jurisdiction of all in per-
sonam proceedings where equitable relief was sought, and, as a result,
admiralty had no power to grant specific performance, injunctions, ref-
ormation or cancellation of maritime contracts, or relief against fraud,
38 135 U.S. 599 (1890).
39 Id at 608.
40 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8 (Knauth 6th ed. 1940). Compare this with D.
ROBERTSON, supra note 15, ch. 4, wherein Professor Robertson observes that in the early years, the
development of United States admiralty jurisdiction rejected the English limitations placed upon
it.
41 See generally D. ROBERTSON, supra note 15, ch. 3; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note
37, at 37passim.
42 Morrison, The Remedial Powers ofthe Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1933).
43 See id. at 8-9.
44 See id. at 9-10.
Equity and Admiralty
5:65(1983)
even when the subject matter was clearly maritime. 5
In the United States, however, as noted in DeLovio, it was held
that admiralty was to have jurisdiction of both in rem and inpersonam
actions, saving to suitors remedies available through the common law
in in personam actions. Admiralty assumed jurisdiction over petitory
actions,46 but remained subject to the English limitation that the court
could not adjudicate equitable titles.47 On possessory actions, jurisdic-
tion was also assumed only where legal title was in dispute,4 although
an equitable title set up as a defense could be adjudicated.
4 9
One author indicated the contradictions inherent in relying upon
the English limitations:
The High Court of Admiralty could not determine equitable interests
in the title to a ship; but this was not because of any distinction between
equitable interests and legal interests, but because the court was denied
the power to deal with questions of title at all. The High Court of Admi-
ralty could not cancel a maritime contract or order it specifically per-
formed, not because the English judges drew any distinction between
legal relief and equitable relief, but because the admiralty was denied the
power generally to act inpersonam. In a court restricted to proceedings in
rem, the matter of equitable relief was eliminated.50
Thus, while American admiralty courts disregarded English tradi-
tion and assumed jurisdiction in both in rem and in personam actions,
they remained tied to the precedent denying equitable jurisdiction,
even though equitable relief was unavailable in English admiralty only
because it lacked inpersonam jurisdiction. The American courts have
continued to make this distinction despite laws enacted subsequently in
England, between 1840 and 1873, removing the limitation upon equita-
ble jurisdiction.5
45 Id. at 11. Today in England these limitations upon admiralty jurisdiction have been re-
moved and a suitor in admiralty may obtain any type of relief. Admiralty Court Act, 3 & 4 Vict.,
ch. 65 (1840); Admiralty Court Act, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 10 (1861); Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66 (1873).
46 Ward v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 267 (1855); New England Ins. Co. v. The Brig Sarah Ann,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 387 (1839); Grigg v. The Clarissa Ann, 11 F. Cas. 47 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877) (No.
5826); The Friendship, 9 F. Cas. 822 (C.C.D. Me. 1855) (No. 5123); Taylor v. The Royal Saxon,
23 F. Cas. 797 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 13, 803); The Tilton, 23 F. Cas. 1277 (C.C.D. Mass. 1830)
(No. 14,054).
47 The Amelia, 23 F. 594 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877); Wenberg v. A Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, 15
F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1833).
48 The Daisy, 29 F. 300 (D. Mass. 1886); The G. Reusens, 23 F. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Thurber
v. The Fannie, 23 F. Cas. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 14,014).
49 Chirung v. Knickerbocker Steam Towage Co., 174 F. 188 (D. Me. 1909).
50 Morrison, supra note 42, at 18 (emphasis added).
51 See supra note 45.
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Legislative and Jurisdictional Issues
Legislation
In three instances, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
review the constitutionality of legislation extending or implying equita-
ble or quasi-contractual powers to the maritime courts. In all three it
upheld the Congressional grants.
The first such legislation reviewed by the Court were the Limited
Liability Acts. 2 These statutes enable a shipowner to limit his liability
for loss or damage, arising out of the operation of his vessel, to the
value of such vessel and its pending freight. The statutes direct individ-
ual vessel owners to initiate "appropriate proceedings in any court" to
enforce a limitation. 3 Vessel owners, in response, began to seek out
the admiralty courts, petitioning them to grant orders restraining multi-
ple suits on one general claim. Their object was to limit all claims to a
single admiralty proceeding. The Supreme Court in Norwich Co. v.
Wright,54 and later in Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill
Manufacturing Co., 5 interpreted the Limited Liability Acts as im-
pliedly authorizing the issuance in admiralty of injunctions for this
purpose, despite the fact that such proceedings are fundamentally equi-
table in nature.
The issuance of injunctions in admiralty was expressly authorized
by Congress in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act of 1927.56 Section 21(b) of this act provided that, if not in
accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended and set
aside through injunction proceedings brought against the deputy com-
missioner making the order.57 In Crowell v. Benson58 the Supreme
Court held that Congress, by statutes and rules, could empower courts
of admiralty to grant such injunctions. 9
Finally, Congress authorized admiralty courts to grant equitable
relief when it enacted the United States Arbitration Act of 1925.60 Sec-
52 Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100, 16 Stat. 458; Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (current
version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181 et. seq.).
53 Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 4, 9 Stat. 635, 635 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 184 (1976)).
54 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
55 109 U.S. 578 (1883).
56 Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.
(1976)). See generally Smith, On the Waterfront at the Pier's Edge: The Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 114 (1970).
57 Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 21(b), 44 Stat. 1424, 1436,amendedby 33 U.S.C. § 921(b), (c)
(1976).
58 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
59 Id. at 49.
60 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1976)).
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tion 4 of the statute provides that a party aggrieved by the alleged fail-
ure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may make a judicial petition for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
the original agreement.6" Where contracts otherwise in admiralty are
involved, these proceedings are to be brought in the admiralty courts.
In effect, this confers upon admiralty the equitable power to enforce
specific performance of a contract. This grant of equitable power was
attacked, however, in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus.62 The Supreme
Court upheld its constitutionality and concluded:
The general power of Congress to provide remedies in matters falling
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and to regulate
their procedure, is indisputable. The petitioner contends that the Con-
gress could not confer upon the courts of admiralty the authority to grant
specific performance. But it is well settled that the Congress, in providing
appropriate means to enforce obligations cognizable in admiralty, may
draw upon other systems. Thus the Congress may authorize a trial by
jury in admiralty, as it has done in relation to certain cases arising on the
Great Lakes. Courts of admiralty may be empowered to grant injunc-
tions, as in the proceedings for limitation of liability. Similarly, there can
be no question of the power of Congress to authorize specific performance
when that is an appropriate remedy in a matter within admiralty
jurisdiction.63
Admiralty courts, then, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Nor-
wich, Providence & New York Steamship Co., and Marine Transit Corp.,
violate no constitutional prohibitions in issuing injunctions or in de-
creeing specific performance.
Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the Limitation of Liability
Acts, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
and the United States Arbitration Act, dealt with Congressional grants
of remedial powers to the admiralty courts. Equity by its nature takes
cognizance of an entire problem area and administers justice com-
pletely. Thus, critics of the Supreme Court's position could argue that
when an admiralty court grants equitable relief it may be taking juris-
diction of both maritime and non-maritime matters, in violation of the
jurisdiction granted to it by the Constitution.64
61- Id. § 4 (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976)). See also Morrison, supra note 42, at 30.
62 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
63 Id. at 278.
64 Morrison, supra note 42, at 31. Morrison refers to this position as "the only possible argu-
ment" that grants of equitable relief may cause jurisdictional conflicts.
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In response to this line of reasoning, one authority answers, that:
jurisdictional limitation. .. can properly be invoked only in a few excep-
tional situations where a true preliminary agreement, or something analo-
gous is actually involved. In the ordinary run of cases, where equitable or
quasi-contractual relief is sought, such relief can be given without the ad-
judication of any issues which are fundamentally non-maritime. All that
is involved is the application of remedies which are needed in order to do
justice in the adjudication of disputes arising out of maritime
transactions.65
The limitations which have been imposed, in other words, are not limi-
tations of jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution, but restrictions ex-
isting in substantive maritime law. Thus, the remedial powers of the
admiralty court were limited-not because of constitutional or statu-
tory defects of jurisdiction-but because the courts misinterpreted and
misapplied the English maritime law. "If the separate admiralty juris-
diction has any value, it is absurd to force the litigant elsewhere merely
because, upon the same subject matter, justice demands some remedy
other than money damages in tort or for breach of contract. '66
II. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1930 TO 1962
Little significant change was achieved through judicial efforts to
change the substantive law restricting admiralty's equitable jurisdiction
during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1940, one leading commentator sug-
gested that, in certain respects, admiralty courts had the inherent ca-
pacity to sit as courts of equity.6' The author, however, was unable to
provide many concrete examples of progress in the recognition of such
capacity. He reasoned that "[i]n deciding the ultimate rights of parties,
from considerations of conscience, justice and humanity, admiralty
sometimes mitigates the severity of contracts," but qualified his conclu-
sions by noting the fact that "[t]he court of admiralty is not a court of
general equity nor has it the characteristic powers of a court of
equity. '"
68
What admiralty was able to do as a court of "equity," by 1940, was
to take cognizance of general average trusts; appoint a receiver under
the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920;69 require an accounting only as inci-
65 Id. at 31-32.
66 Id. at 33.
67 1 E. BENEDICT, supra note 40, § 71.
68 Id. § 71, at 148. An admiralty court "is bound, by its nature and constitution, to give judg-
ment upon equitable principles and according to the rules of natural justice. It cannot in a techni-
cal sense be called a court of equity. It is rather a court of justice." Id. § 71, at 151.




dental to the main relief and as to jurisdiction acquired upon acknowl-
edged grounds; and review, within narrow limits, the award of
arbitrators and dispose of non-maritime subjects in a limitation of lia-
bility proceeding.
70
Further, admiralty courts were allowed to give effect to equitable
estoppel;71 prevent a party from taking advantage of his own fraud in a
contract;72 treat a contract as nullified by fraud;7 3 or entertain a defense
based upon fraudulent misrepresentation. 74
In 1950, George C. Sprague, in an extensive footnote in Cases on
the Law of Admiralty,75 described the little progress that had been
made in expanding admiralty's equity powers during the preceding
decade. To the previous list of equity powers, he could add only that
jurisdiction will be taken in a suit for an accounting where the account
is incidental to a maritime cause of action,76 and that a court of admi-
ralty may look through a "dummy" transaction of maritime nature and
hold liable the real principal.77 He also cited Sound Marine & Machine
Corp. v. Westchester County,78 where admiralty took jurisdiction of a
suit by a yacht basin to compel respondent either to lower sewer pipes
which interferred with ingress to and egress from the yacht basin at low
tide or to pay damages. In addition, he cited Commercial Trust Co. v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp .,7' which held that
admiralty, in a suit by a pledgee of freights securing a maritime loan,
had jurisdiction to trace such freights into the hands of a third person
in whatever form they might be.
The Vexatious Dicta or Bad Seed
For the litigant seeking equitable relief-or, more specifically, in-
junctive relief-in admiralty, the greatest impediment is the continuing
authority of the "Schoenamsgruber Doctrine." 80 The landmark United
70 1 E. BENEDICT, supra note 40, § 71, at 148-49; see also The Emma B., 140 F. 770 (D.C.N.J.
1905).
71 See Higgins v. Anglo-Algerian S.S. Co., 248 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1918).
72 Id; see also The Hero, 6 F. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1881).
73 See The Stanley H. Miner, 172 F. 486, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (dicta).
74 See The Electron, 48 F. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1891).
75 G. SPRAGUE, CASES ON THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 90-91 (1950).
76 Id. (citing, among others, Fischer v. Carey, 159 P. 577 (1916)).
77 Id. (citing Gardner v. Dantzler Lumber & Export Co., 98 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1938)).
78 100 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 642 (1938).
79 48 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1931). See Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951), where it
was held that the equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches are recognized and applied in
admiralty.
80 Robertson, supra note 6, at 1637.
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States Supreme Court decision announced in 1935, Schoenamsgruber v.
Hamburg American Line,81 is generally regarded as the authority for
the proposition that injunctive relief historically and currently is not
available in admiralty. Although never overruled, the Schoenam-
sgruber Doctrine, which, interestingly, emerged from obiter dicta in the
case, has come to mean that although admiralty courts indeed have the
capacity to apply the broad principles of equity designed to promote
justice, they do not have what is regarded as equitable jurisdiction; fur-
thermore, except in limitations of liability proceedings, they are not
empowered to issue injunctive relief.82
Swif, Archawski, and Vaughan: Positive Movements
In the 1950s two important cases, both decided by the Supreme
Court, set the stage for the application of more than just equitable prin-
ciples by the courts of admiralty. The first of these was Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,s3 decided in 1950.
In Sw/ft, Swift & Co. Packers had purchased a cargo in transit on
board the Cali, a ship owned by the Compania Transmaritima Colom-
biana. The cargo was lost through the alleged negligence of Colombi-
ana, and Swift & Co. brought a libel inpersonam to recover the loss. A
foreign attachment was issued against the Alacran, one of Colum-
biana's other ships. Swift & Co. then filed a supplemental libel alleging
that a few days prior to the suit a new corporation, Compania Colom-
biana Del Caribe, had been formed under the laws of Columbia to take
over Compania Transmaritima Colombiana's property in fraud of
Swift & Co.'s rights. Swift also sought a new attachment against the
Alacran, now renamed the Caribe and listed among Del Caribe's
assets.84
Swift's plea for attachment against the Caribe was granted, but
was subsequently dismissed by the district court after a hearing on Del
Caribe's motion to vacate. The district court dismissed on the theory
that the only relief sought was of an equitable nature, i.e., for the court
to purge the alleged fraudulent act.85 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no jurisdiction in admi-
81 294 U.S. 454 (1935).
82 Id. at 457-58.
83 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
84 Id. at 685-86.
85 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Transmaritima Colombiana, S.A., 83 F. Supp. 273 (D.
Canal Zone 1948), affirmed sub nom. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949), reversed and remanded, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
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ralty.8 6 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, which reversed
and remanded. 7 The Court held that a libel to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance under the circumstances of this case was within admiralty
jurisdiction."8
In granting such relief the Court was unwilling to depart radically
from precedent and expand the remedial powers of the admiralty
courts. It was willing, however, to reject the requirement found in prior
cases that a claim, to be recognized, must be wholly maritime. The
Court reasoned that recognizing the subsidiary powers of admiralty to
deal justly with claims within its jurisdiction did not enlarge the admi-
ralty jurisdiction, but avoided its "multilating restrictions." 9
The Court opined it would "hobble" admiralty to exclude it rigor-
ously from all contact with non-maritime transactions and from all eq-
uitable relief, especially in a "legal system that has been so responsive
to the practicalities of maritime commerce and so inventive in adapting
its jurisdiction to the needs of that commerce." 90
Then, stepping back a little, the Court warned that a court of ad-
miralty will not enforce an independent equitable claim just because it
pertains to maritime property.91 An equitable claim must be incidental
to, or arise out of, a cause already within the admiralty court's jurisdic-
tion. The equitable claim, according to Swift, cannot arise first.92
The Supreme Court seemed willing to take the action it did be-
cause it viewed Del Caribe's fraudulent transfer as an attempt to escape
its jurisdiction, and stated, "The basis of admiralty's power is to protect
its jurisdiction from being thwarted by a fraudulent transfer, and that
applies equally whether it is concerned with executing its judgment or
authorizing an attachment to secure an independent maritime claim." 93
Six years later, in 1956, the Court in a breach of contract action
declared that admiralty had jurisdiction to prevent unjust enrichment
when it arose out of the breach of a maritime contract. The case was
Archawski v. Hanioti.94 Petitioners, Archawski, et al., alleged that re-
spondent, Hanioti, after accepting money from them for passage upon
86 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949),
reversed and remanded, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
87 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
88 Id. at 695.
89 Id. at 693.
90 Id. at 691.
91 Id. at 690.
92 See id. at 690-93.
93 Id. at 694-95.
94 350 U.S. 532 (1956).
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the vessel City of Athens, scheduled for a July 15, 1947 trip to Europe,
abandoned the voyage. Petitioner's libel continued by charging Hani-
oti with wrongfully and deliberately applying the passage money to his
own use and benefit.95
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, began his opinion by as-
serting that allegations of wrongfulness and fraud do not alter the es-
sential character of a libel. He cited DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Vance96 for the ancient admiralty teaching that "[t]he rules of pleading
in the admiralty are exceedingly simple and free from technical re-
quirements." 97 Justice Douglas attempted, as the Court had in Swif?, to
ground the equitable relief sought in a thoroughly maritime cause of
action-here, breach of contract. He declared, "Though these particu-
lar allegations of the libel sound in fraud or in the wrongful withhold-
ing of moneys, it is plain in the context that the obligation to pay the
moneys arose because of the contract to transport passengers. '"98
In response to authorities who had denied admiralty's power to
grant relief in assumpsit cases "because the implied promise to repay
the moneys which cannot in good conscience be retained. . . is not a
maritime contract," 99 Justice Douglas cited Justice Stone in Krause
Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp.:'°
Even under the common law form of action for money had and received
there could be no recovery without proof of the breach of the contract
involved in demanding the payment, and the basis of the recovery there,
as in admiralty, is the violation of some term of the contract of affreight-
ment, whether by failure to carry or by exaction of freight which the con-
tract did not authorize.' 0 '
Douglas concluded that cases like Archawski involve neither sec-
ond contracts nor actual promises to repay passage money. Rather, the
problem, as he perceived it, was to prevent unjust enrichment from a
maritime contract. He continued with the statement, "A court that pre-
vents a maritime contract from being exploited in that way does not
reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs. We conclude that, so
long as the claim asserted rises out of a maritime contract, the admi-
95 Id. at 533-34.
96 60 U.S. (19 How.) 162 (1856), cited with approval in Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. at 534.
97 Id. at 171-72.
98 Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. at 534.
99 Id., quoting United Transportation & Lading Co. v. New York & B.T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391
(2d Cir. 1911).
100 290 U.S. 117 (1933).
101 Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. at 535, quoting Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 290
U.S. 117, 124 (1933).
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ralty court has jurisdiction over it.' 0 2 Finally, while admitting that
"[r]ights which admiralty recognizes as serving the ends of justice are
often indistinguishable from ordinary quasi-contractual rights created
to prevent unjust enrichment,"1 3 the Court did not hold it necessary to
decide how far the concept of quasi-contracts might be applied in
admiralty.
Particularly after Archawski, it can readily be seen that Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Swit in 19501' heralded what may be re-
garded as a shift in judicial attitude by the Supreme Court. For with
this case it was recognized that the federal courts sitting in admiralty no
longer were to be limited in their use of equitable principles merely to
further the ends of justice. Instead, Sw#i? determined that in the dispo-
sition of a true maritime claim, subsidiary issues could be disposed of
even though they may be of a traditionally equitable nature. 0 5 With-
out over-extending the current emphasis of Swift, the case should be
viewed as holding that admiralty should not become so self-restrictive
as to prevent justifiable maritime claims from being adjudicated.
In Vaughan v. Atkinson, °6 a 1962 decision, the Supreme Court
again considered whether admiralty could award equitable relief. Jus-
tice Douglas, again speaking for the Court, declared, "Equity is no
stranger in admiralty; admiralty courts are, indeed, authorized to grant
equitable relief."'107
Although this statement appears to be the Supreme Court's
broadest statement on the topic, the facts of the case tend to diminish
its impact. In Vaughan, the Court provided the equitable remedy of
attorney's fees. 10 8 These attorney's fees were awarded as part of com-
pensatory damages; they were not based on an independent equitable
recovery. 10 9 Therefore, as in Swift, the claim for equitable relief in
Vaughan was founded on an issue that was subsidiary to the maritime
claim.
It is indisputable that the Supreme Court in Swift, Archawski, and
Vaughan, while taking a very cautious approach to the status of in-
dependent equitable claims, did extend admiralty's power to grant re-
lief in cases where claims for relief arise out of a maritime action.
102 Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. at 535.
103 Id. at 536.
104 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
106 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
107 Id. at 530.
108 Id. at 527.
109 Id. at 530-31.
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Equitable claims, to be judicially recognized, need not be wholly
maritime.
III. TOWARD A POLICY OF EXPANSION OR MEASURED CONFUSION
By 1963 four circuit courts had issued decisions interpreting either
the Swift, Archawski, or Vaughan opinions."10 The availability of eq-
uitable relief from a federal district court sitting in admiralty was far
from a clear matter.
While the Fifth Circuit"' expressed a willingness to grant equita-
ble relief whenever it was appropriate, the Second"' and Ninth Cir-
cuits" 3 continued to make injunctive relief unavailable and relied on
historical reasons for making this decision. The Seventh Circuit tended
to follow the Second Circuit's approach." 4
Since Swi/t, Archawski, and Vaughan, the federal district courts
and circuit courts of appeal sitting in admiralty have had increasing
occasion to exercise and extend their remedial powers. Traditionally,
admiralty is said to lack the "jurisdiction" of equity, though it may
apply equitable principles to the subject matter of its jurisdiction."15
Justice Frankfurter would take issue with such a distinction; speaking
for the Court in Swift, he declared:
The reasoning of the District Court was based on the view that a claim of
fraud in the transfer of a vessel was a matter for determination by a court
of equity and therefore outside the bounds of admiralty jurisdiction.
There is a good deal of loose talk to this effect in the reports, concurrent
with talk that courts of admiralty exercise their jurisdiction upon equita-
ble principles." 6
In answer he responded:
We find no restriction upon admiralty by chancery so unrelenting as
to bar the grant of any equitable relief even when that relief is subsidiary
to issues wholly within admiralty jurisdiction. Certainly there is no
ground for believing that this restriction was accepted as a matter of
110 Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962); Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. v. The Falcon, 305
F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1962); Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1960); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'don other
grounds, 362 U.S. 365, reh'g denied, 363 U.S. 809 (1960).
111 Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962).
112 Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
113 Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 362 U.S. 365, reh'g denied, 363 U.S. 809 (1960).
114 Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. v. The Falcon, 305 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1962).
1 15 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 37, at 37-38.
116 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1950).
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course by the framers of the Constitution so that such sterilization of ad-
miralty jurisdiction can be said to have been presupposed by Article III of
the Constitution.'
1 7
The admiralty courts have not been consistent in the way they ap-
proach equity jurisdiction (as distinguished from the application of eq-
uitable principles). A New York district court in Esso Standard
(Switzerland) v. The Arosa Sun 1 8 held in 1960 that in the admiralty
practice generally "equitable principles rather than technical rules and
forms should be the paramount consideration[;]. . . the objective is to
do substantial justice between the parties."119 Four years later, in Did-
dlebock v. Aloca S.S. Co.,'2 ° a Pennsylvania district court was more
assertive in stating that "equity is not a stranger in Admiralty, and the
Admiralty Courts may grant or deny any equitable relief depending
upon the merits of the relief sought."''
In 1966, the same court in Gooden v. Texaco, Inc.12 2 suggested that
the court, while sitting in admiralty, was largely a court of equity at-
tempting to render natural justice between the parties involved, and
further held that an admiralty court was bound to determine cases sub-
mitted to it upon equitable principles and according to the rules of nat-
ural justice. A Michigan district court, in Nice v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railroad Co.,' 23 made the same appeal, declaring that equity and jus-
tice were the foundation and substance of admiralty law. Admiralty
courts, therefore, follow the principles of equity and natural justice and
are not bound by common law rules.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the
case of Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monjiore, ' 24 referred to the admi-
ralty trial judge as a seagoing chancellor. 25 Finally, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in a 1970 decision, Oceanic Trading Corp. v.
Vessel Diana,26 noted that "[tihe proceedings in admiralty and the
powers of the admiralty court have long been held to be 'akin to those
of a court of equity.' "127
117 Id. at 691-92.
118 184 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
119 Id. at 127.
120 234 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
121 Id. at 814.
122 255 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1966), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 378 F.2d 576 (3d
Cir. 1967).
123 305 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Mich. 1969).
124 409 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1969).
125 Id. at 1346.
126 423 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970).
127 Id. at 4, quoting The Minnetoka, 146 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1906).
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Whether the courts have been willing to admit fully to an equita-
ble jurisdiction or partially to an expansive application of equitable
principles, the result in the years since Archawski has been a steady
growth of equitable relief available to an admiralty claimant.
In the remainder of this section, the article explores the develop-
ments under the following equitable doctrines: fraud and misrepresen-
tation,128 injunctions,129 quasi-contract and unjust enrichment,
130
subrogation and laches,13 ' and constructive trusts,1 32 as well as the ar-




Less than three months after Archawski was decided, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Putnam v. Lower,136 was again attempting
to define the boundaries of admiralty's equitable jurisdiction. This ac-
tion was brought subsequent to the attachment and sale of the Silver
Spray to pay for debts incurred in a failed tuna fishing venture. The
venture was in part financed by the appellants, who each paid $2,500
for a working one-tenth share on the Silver Spray.
The appellees were holders of a valid, recorded ship mortgage on
the vessel in the amount of $30,000. Both sets of parties filed libels and
both were awarded money damages. However, when the Silver Spray
was attached and sold by the United States Marshall, only $11,000 was
realized from the sale. Because that amount was inadequate to satisfy,
even partially, their subordinated mortgage lien, appellants Putnam
and Overman brought this appeal.1
37
The district court foreclosed the mortgage, subordinating it to the
wage liens of the sharemen. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded in part. 38 In reaching its decision, the circuit
court was forced to respond to the contention of Putnam and Overman
that the causes of action asserted by the sharesmen were essentially
common law actions for fraud and deceit, and thus not cognizable by
128 See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 174-96 and accompanying text.
132 See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
133 See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
134 See infra notes 213-25 and accompanying text.
135 See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
136 236 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1956).
137 Id. at 563-65.
138 Id. at 573.
Equity and Admiralty
5:65(1983)
the district court sitting as a court of admiralty.
39
The court replied that the mere entrance of fraud in any form into
a case otherwise maritime did not oust admiralty of its jurisdiction.
[Where the first and fundamental exercise of judicial power is maritime,
and the issue of fraud arises incidental to its general jurisdiction, then a
court of admiralty may deal with the question of fraud, though intrinsi-
cally non-maritime, pursuant to its power to make a complete adjustment
of rights over which admiralty has independent jurisdiction.'1
0
Speaking for the court, Circuit Judge Stephens noted that "where
the original jurisdiction is maritime, a court of admiralty may entertain
an issue of fraud, mistake, or other equitable claim, where either is
alleged as affecting the rights of the parties to a maritime action."''
The court awarded appellees the respective amounts expended by
them for the working share agreements, as well as a fair allowance for
their time and services in sailing the Silver Spray. However, only the
latter award, which took the form of seamen's wages, took priority over
the mortgage of the appellants. The former sums were awarded strictly
on the basis of breach of contract.
142
Even before Swift, the Southern District of New York in 1952, in a
suit at law for a seaman's injury, held that a district court had power to
ignore or to set aside an enforcement of a prior state court judgment
obtained by fraud.'4 3 As a result, the plaintiff in Mortensen v. Alcoa
S.S. Co. was allowed to set up alleged fraud as a defense to the defend-
ant's plea of the bar of the state court judgment.' 4
Similarly, the District Court of Oregon held in United States v. The
Tug Manzanillo & Shaver Transportation Co., 14 a 1960 case, that equi-
table principles prohibited dual recovery by a seaman, first for mainte-
nance and cure from his employer, and then for loss of earnings and
medical and hospital expenses, from a negligent third party.
Corporate fraud was the issue in Zubik v. Zubik, 146 a 1967 case
decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The suit was brought
in admiralty by the owners of moored vessels to recover for damages
caused to their vessels by drifting barges which had broken from their
moorings. Originally brought in the Western District of Pennsylvania,
139 Id. at 568-69.
140 Id. at 569.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 573.
143 Mortensen v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 101 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
144 Id.
145 190 F. Supp. 229 (D. Or. 1960), rev'd, 310 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1962).
146 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
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the libel allowed negligence by Charles Zubik, individually, and
Charles Zubik & Sons, Inc., a corporate entity. The appellees in this
action petitioned the circuit court to affirm the district court's award of
damages against both Zubik and the corporation as one and the
same. 1
47
The circuit court, instead, reversed the award against Zubik on the
grounds that the district court had erred in piercing the corporate
veil. 148 It did not deny that admiralty had sufficient jurisdiction to dis-
regard corporate existence in order to prevent fraud, illegality, or injus-
tice, or when it recognized that that entity would defeat public policy or
shield someone from liability for crime. But it did find that the court
had misapplied the test in directing an award against Zubik individu-
ally.149 Zubik was a strong statement affirming admiralty's power to
deal with corporate fraud in a maritime action.
Injunctions
The courts generally appear willing to do justice in seamen's in-
jury cases. In 1961 the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court's decree in
admiralty permanently enjoining a litigious seaman from making fur-
ther claims on a sixteen-year-old cause of action. The case was Clinton
v. United States.
50
The courts, however, have been less willing to grant injunctive re-
lief in other areas. In Moran Towing & Transportation Co. v. United
States,'5 the United States brought a motion before the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal from an order of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York granting a stay pending
the determination of certain questions of fact pursuant to a disputes
clause in a maritime contract. The circuit court granted the govern-
ment's motion, finding the order interlocutory and not appealable.'52
Appellants had also claimed that the order was appealable as an
injunction under section 1292 of 28 U.S.C. 53 The court responded that
it was in fact a mere calendar order and that even if it had been an
147 Id. at 269-70.
148 Id. at 275-76.
149 Id. at 274.
150 297 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 856 (1962).
151 290 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1961).
152 Id. at 662-63.
153 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, that the court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States...
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve injunc-
tions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
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injunction "[t]he power of admiralty to issue injunctions appears to be
circumscribed."' 54
In 1959, Gilmore and Black hypothesized that perhaps the lan-
guage in Swift indicated that a "'doctrinal trend' is in the making that
would render the ordinary equitable remedies of specific performance
and injunction available to the admiralty court, in cases of maritime
contract and tort."'155 At least for injunctions, a trend has not devel-
oped. One commentator has observed, "It remains to be seen whether
the Court will in later cases find that admiralty has power to give the
equitable relief of injunction, reformation or specific performance
when that relief is subsidiary to issues wholly within admiralty jurisdic-
tion." ' 56 In a 1960 case, Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Interna-
tional Union,5 7 the Second Circuit dismissed a complaint by an
Egyptian corporation seeking a temporary restraining order against
union picketing of its vessel. While sufficient to support jurisdiction in
admiralty and to authorize a future award of damages, the court said
that admiralty could not grant injunctive relief.15 8
Quasi-Contract and Unjust Enrichment
Unlike the situation with injunctions, there has been some measur-
able progress in the area of quasi-contractual jurisdiction. In 1939,
Professor Robinson stated in his text on admiralty, "There is no admi-
ralty jurisdiction in quasi-contract even when the claim arises out of a
maritime contract."' 59 Twenty years later, Gilmore and Black identi-
fied quasi-contractual claims arising out of maritime transactions as a
"doubtful area" of admiralty jurisdiction "where generalization is dan-
gerous."' 160  Herbert Baer, in 1969, quoted Justice Douglas in
Archawski:
How far the concept of quasi-contracts may be applied in admiraliy it
is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to hold that admiralty
has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at
common law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the
154 Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d at 660.
155 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 39 (lst ed. 1959).
156 H. BAER, THE ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 473 (1979). Clinton v. United
States, 297 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 856 (1962), and Moran Towing &
Tran p. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1961), would appear to be the only two "in-
junctive oriented" cases before Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 10 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
157 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
158 Id. at 53.
159 G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 197 (1939).
160 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 155, at 25.
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breach of a maritime contract.
16 1
Baer concluded that "[ilt thus appears that given the necessary nexus
with a maritime contract, admiralty has jurisdiction of causes of action
based upon the concept of unjust enrichment which in common law
courts are denominated as actions in quasi-contract."'
' 62
Case law confirms Baer. In 1961, in Hadipateras v. Pacjfca,
S.A ., 163 the Fifth Circuit held that resort to quasi-contract principles
will not deprive admiralty of jurisdiction as long as the claim asserted
arises out of a maritime contract over which an admiralty court has
jurisdiction.
The action in Hadpateras was a libel in personam by owners of
the S.S. Athenoula against the Pacifica Shipping Co. and its stockhold-
ers and officers for a money decree based upon nonperformance of a
contract to manage the Athenoula for a specific period. Respondents
argued that the court could not take jurisdiction of an action for in-
debitatus assumpsit. The court replied that Archawski had rejected that
argument once and for all."6 Circuit Judge John Brown, speaking for
the court, continued:
And if there ever were any real basis for doubting the capacity-if
not the imperative duty-of admiralty to consider equitable doctrines in
arriving at just judgments, it was certainly dispelled in Swift and Company
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe .... If the admiralty has
the power to penetrate fraud to say that a vessel standing in the name of
one belongs in fact to another, and then effectively lays hold of that ves-
sel, it is perfectly evident, especially with the availability of modem inno-
vations such as declaratory judgments, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, that hoary
expressions about equity require careful re-evaluation. 65
Respondents had also objected that this was a suit for an account-
ing. The court observed that it is an "accounting" here only in the
sense that a "counting" was necessary to determine the amount of the
judgment. Citing language in Swift, the court stated that while admi-
ralty will not entertain a suit for an accounting as such, when account-
ing is necessary to complete adjudgment of rights over which admiralty
has independent jurisdiction, it will not suspend its remedies midway
and require parties to resort to another court.
66
Unjust enrichment was the issue in Sommer Corp. v. Panama Ca-
161 H. BAER, supra note 156, at 476, quoting Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532, 536 (1956).
162 Id. at 476.
163 290 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1961).





nal Co .,167 a case decided ten years after Hadipateras by the District
Court for the Canal Zone. Sommer Corp., a contractor, brought this
action against the Panama Canal Co. for damages to its goods carried
aboard one of the company's vessels, the S.S. Cristobal.
The Panama Canal Co. was then a wholly-owned agency of the
United States. In June 1967, it entered into a contract with Sommer
whereby the plaintiff agreed to install electrical equipment in the com-
pany's power plant and defendant agreed to pay for the work. The
electrical equipment was shipped to the Canal Zone aboard the Cristo-
bal, and during the voyage the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA) 168 was in effect and governed the contract of carriage.
16 9
When the goods were discharged in the Canal Zone the act was no
longer operative, but its provisions were incorporated into and made a
part of a contract governing their transisthmian rail transportation. As
a result, the relationship between the parties became contractual. At
some time after the goods were discharged from the defendant's cus-
tody, Sommer's goods were damaged.
70
The Panama Canal Co. argued that by the terms of COGSA, the
parties were actually an independent shipper and an independent car-
rier.17 ' The court rejected this argument and found instead a close con-
tractual relationship, with the effect that rather than being a contract
for shipping in the regular channels of commerce this was actually a
contract for construction where the defendant had agreed, as a part of
its obligations, to transport the goods to the construction site. Thus, to
deny plaintiff his relief for over $9,600 in damages would result in un-
just enrichment for the defendant.
72
The court concluded, citing Baer's Admiralty Law of the Supreme
Court, "Admiralty has power to give equitable relief in causes of action
based upon the concept of unjust enrichment when the claim arises out
of a maritime contract."'
173
167 329 F. Supp. 1187 (D.C.Z. 1971), mod jed, 475 F.2d 292 (1973).
168 Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 229,49 Stat. 1207, codedat 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-1315 (West 1975
& Supp. 1982).
169 Sommer Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 329 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
170 Id. at 1190.
171 The point of the Panama Canal Co.'s argument here is unclear. While COGSA defines
"carrier," see 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a), it does not specifically state independent shipper or carrier.
Nevertheless, it is highly speculative whether this is significant.
172 Sommer Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 329 F. Supp. at 1191.
173 Id.
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Subrogation and Laches
Subrogation is also an equitable remedy, one borrowed from the
civil law.' 74 It is a legal fiction through which a person who pays the
debt of another is substituted for the other with regard to all rights and
remedies of the other;175 the debt is treated in equity as still existing for
his benefit. The underlying principle here is that the person seeking the
subrogation must have paid the debt under grave necessity to save him-
self a loss and, thus, the right is never accorded to a volunteer. 176 It is
also a remedy recently available in admiralty.
In Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J Perez Ex-
port Co., 17 7 the Fifth Circuit noted that through subrogation equity
seeks to prevent the unearned enrichment of one party at the expense
of another. The case itself involved a shipper, A.J. Perez, which sought
to pay in advance freight charges due the Compania Anonima Venezo-
lana through Alonzo Shipping Co., a freight forwarder. The freight
forwarder, however, failed to remit the funds to the local agent of the
carrier. Though the agent knew that the freight forwarder was not hon-
oring its promise to pay or return within four days of release of the bill
of lading, it did nothing to put the shipper on notice until more than
five months after one shipment and nearly ten months after a second.
Instead, the local agent, acting as a sort of guarantor, paid the carrier
himself. 178
When its agent was not identified, the carrier, Compania
Anonima, sued A.J. Perez as the shipper for the freight due. The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana rendered judgment for
the shipper. 179 The circuit court on appeal observed that "[i]t is harsh
enough when vis-a-vis Carrier and Shipper it is law that commands a
shipper to pay twice if the carrier has not in fact received the money. It
is shocking to say that equity would compel it."' 8 °
The court found that the agent's failure to notify the shipper that
freight charges were still due and owing-in an attempt to preserve the
good will of the freight forwarder who might throw him more busi-
ness-was "laches, in its plainest form."'' "As such," the court contin-
174 See Comment, Subrogation-An Equitable Device for Achieving Preferences and Priorities,
31 MicH. L. REv. 826, 829 (1932-33).
175 Id. at 830.
176 See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 251 (1973).
177 303 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962).
178 Id. at 694-95.
179 See id. at 694.
180 Id. at 698 (emphasis in original).
181 Id. at 699.
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ued, "it bars equitable relief by one claiming an equitable status [the
agent as subrogee to the carrier's rights against the shipper] even
though, as between carrier and shipper, limitations may not have
run." 1
82
Circuit Judge Brown did not deny admiralty's ability to grant a
subrogation. In fact, he concluded that the trial judge was correct in
concluding that the agent, who had paid the entire amount due to the
carrier, "had the right to seek subrogation to the rights of the Carrier
(as creditor) against the Shipper (as debtor or principal)."' 8 3 But, he
continued, "the equities were overwhelmingly in favor of the Shipper,
and to grant what the Agent sought would produce, not equity, but
inequity.'
184
In poetic language he finally noted that "[tihe Chancellor is no
longer fixed to the woolsack. He may stride the quarter-deck of mari-
time jurisprudence and, in the role of admiralty judge, dispense, as
would his landlocked brother, that which equity and good conscience
impels."' 85
Subrogation was also the issue in Amerind Shipping Corp. v. The
Jordan International Co.'86 Amerind Shipping Corp., acting as an
agent for Federal Commerce & Navigation Co., an ocean carrier, ac-
cepted a shipment of steel and steel products from Jordan International
Co. through the Port of New Orleans. The Port's tariff imposed a
wharfage charge in the amount of $9,360.87 against the cargo when it
was delivered and loaded into barges. Amerind paid the wharfage and
claimed reimbursement from Jordan.
Jordan answered by claiming that Amerind's true debtor was Fed-
eral Commerce, to which Amerind contended that it had a claim
against Jordan either as the subrogee of the Dock Board, or under the
doctrine of negotiorium gestio.*8
The court replied that the claim appeared to be either one in sub-
rogation or one in quasi-contract. Both claims were cognizable in ad-
miralty: subrogation by the language in Compania Anonima
182 Id.
183 Id. at 696 (emphasis in original).
184 Id. at 699.
185 Id.
186 314 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. La. 1970).
187 Id. at 1325. Negotiorium gestio is classically defined in the civil law as "[a] species of spon-
taneous agency, or an interference by one in the affairs of another, in his absence, from benevo-
lence or friendship, and without authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (5th ed. 1979).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:65(1983)
Venezolana' 8  and quasi-contract by the language in Archawski v.
Hanioti.I89 The jurisdiction of admiralty courts, it warned, should not
be restricted to the narrow concept set forth in Jordan's motion to dis-
miss and motion for summary judgment. 90 Quoting Swift, it con-
cluded that failure to recognize admiralty's jurisdiction over claims in
subrogation or quasi-contract would "hobble" the maritime legal
system. '
9 '
Compania Anonima weighed the rights of two parties to equitable
relief, one in subrogation and one in laches. Without denying the first
party's right to seek subrogation the court found on balance the subro-
gee's subsequent conduct constituted laches in its plainest form.' In
Florida Bahamas Lines v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau,193 Judge
John Brown, again speaking for the Fifth Circuit, granted laches in a
lien-priority contest. He reasoned that "laches was a flexible measure
of the time within which a claim in admiralty must be asserted."'
194
The important constitutent elements of laches as he saw them were un-
reasonable delay by one party in his remedy and prejudice to another
as a result of the delay. 19 Finally, the crucial question in determining
whether laches applies is whether it would be inequitable because of
delay to enforce the claim. Here, Judge Brown held that laches barred
enforcement of a lien for wharfage as prior to a mortgage.
196
Constructive Trust
Equity has also been invoked in determining the existence of a
constructive trust. Thus, Compania De Navegacione Almirante S.A.
Panama v. Certain Proceeds of Cargo of the Vessel SS. Searaven,197
decided in 1967, involved an action by an unpaid owner of a chartered
vessel to libel the proceeds of cargo, freights and subfreights of the ves-
sel. Under the terms of the charter party, libelant, a Panamanian cor-
188 Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A.J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d 692
(5th Cir.) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 942 (1962). See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
189 350 U.S. 532 (1956). For a discussion ofArchawski, see supra notes 94-103 and accompany-
ing text.
190 Amerind Shipping Corp. v. Jordan International Co., 314 F. Supp. at 1326.
191 Id., quoting Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 691
(1950).
192 See supra text accompanying note 181.
193 433 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1970).
194 Id. at 1250.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1251.




poration, had an express lien upon the cargo for freight. The shipper's
bank, however, to which it owed a large indebtedness, also asserted its
banker's lien against such proceeds.
98
The respondent bank, Beverly Hills Bank & Trust Co., as con-
structive trustee, was ordered by the United States District Court for
the Central District of California to deposit enough money in the ship-
per's account to satisfy the charter hire. It was ordered to do so without
prejudice to its right to contend that the court's action was improper. 199
The bank contended that the libelant shipowner lost its lien on the
cargo by failing to libel the cargo for charter hire prior to its delivery to
the consignees. The court disagreed, stating, "[H]ere libelant's claim
that it would be grossly inequitable if the Bank could avoid the pay-
ment of the charter hire, i.e. reasonable freight, was sound." 2" The
shipowner had attached the proceeds of the freight earned by the cargo
while they were in the charter's bank and while the cargo was still in
the ship's possession.
The court concluded:
As the Supreme Court in Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe
: I * ruled, an Admiralty Court can, as a means of effectuating a claim
incontestably in Admiralty, determine subsidiary or derivative equitable
issues. To stay the hands of Admiralty as to a matter intrinsically non-
maritime but necessary to the complete adjustment of rights over which
admiralty has independent jurisdiction would seriously impair the dis-
charge by Admiralty of the task which belongs to it.20
The district court's decision on its face appeared to contravene a
long-standing precedent foreclosing admiralty courts from declaring or
enforcing a trust. The Ninth Circuit was more cautious on appeal; in
1971 in Beverly Hills National Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania De Nave-
gacione Almirante S.A., Panama,02 it reversed the district court. Cir-
cuit Judge Browning, speaking for the court, found that had Compania
advanced its constructive trust theory as the sole support for its claim,
there would have been no jurisdiction in admiralty.
20 3
But it also advanced the theory-clearly in admiralty-that it had
a maritime lien on the fund held by Beverly Hills National Bank.
Thus, the district court, despite the fact that it purported to exercise
admiralty jurisdiction, did have, under United Mine Workers of
198 Id. at 78-79.
199 Id. at 79.
200 Id. at 80.
201 Id. at 81.
202 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 996 (1972).
203 Id. at 305.
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America v. Gibbs,2 04 pendent jurisdiction over the equitable claim.
20 5
Then, turning to the merits of the case, the circuit court agreed with the
appellant that the district court's findings did not support the imposi-
tion of constructive trust for Compania's benefit.
20 6
Thus, the circuit court, while reversing the district court, still left
the door open to admiralty courts to decide an equitable constructive
trust where there is pendent jurisdiction. And it did this despite lan-




The courts in recent years have exercised remedial powers in a
number of suits arising out of seamen's injuries. One of the most
widely quoted is Vaughan v. Atkinson, 201 a case heard by the United
States Supreme Court on certiorari to the Fourth Circuit in 1962. In
that case, petitioner Vaughan, a seaman, was discharged from respon-
dent's ship at the end of a voyage and received from its master a certifi-
cate to enter a Public Health Service Hospital. The hospital admitted
him as an inpatient, treated him for suspected tuberculosis for several
weeks, and then treated him as an outpatient for over two years before
declaring him fit for duty.
When he was admitted to outpatient status, Vaughan sent the
shipowner a copy of his medical record and requested payment for
maintenance and cure. His request was denied and he went to work as
a taxi driver to support himself while receiving outpatient treatment.
Finally, he brought suit in admiralty to recover maintenance and cure
and for damages.20 9
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, awarded both elements.
The damages included Vaughan's counsel fees as a necessary expense
of collecting his recovery. Douglas justified the Court's award in these
words, "Equity is no stranger in admiralty; admiralty courts are indeed
authorized to grant equitable relief."110
Quoting Vaughan, the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
Division, passed on the responsibility for maintenance and cure to a
204 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
205 Beverly Hills Natl Bank & Trust Co., 437 F.2d at 305-06.
206 Id. at 307.
207 The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890).
208 369 U.S. 527 (1962). See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text for a limited analysis of
this important case.
209 Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. at 527-29.
210 Id. at 530.
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negligent tortfeasor six years later in Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John
the Baptist Bridge & Ferry Authority.211 In that action, a ferry boat
deckhand, struck by a motorist driving off the ferry, sued the bridge
and ferry authority and its insurer for maintenance and cure. The
court concluded that:
it seemed only fair that in allocating the burden of paying for mainte-
nance and cure between an innocent shipowner and a tortfeasor whose
negligence caused a seaman's injury, the person who caused the injury
ought to bear the responsibility. Equity is no stranger in admiralty...
and equity is done in such situations by placing primary liability for
maintenance and cure on the tortfeasor who caused the seaman's
injury.
2 12
Implied Warranty and Indemnification
Breach of an implied warranty was the basis of an award granted
by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Nikforow v. Rittenhouse,1 3
which involved another personal injury action, this one brought in
1970. The suit resulted from an injury sustained by a member of the
United States Coast Guard in attempting to tow defendant Ritten-
house's yacht from a sand bar. After a jury trial, plaintiff Nikiforow
received a verdict and judgment of $60,000 against the defendant. 4
Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, the United States sought,
under the Medical Care Recovery Act,21 5 to recover expenses incurred
in providing medical treatment for the plaintiff. In answer, Rit-
tenhouse filed a counterclaim against the United States seeking indem-
nity, a remedy in equity.
216
The court found that Rittenhouse's negligence was merely "pas-
sive" or "secondary" to the "active" and "primary" negligence of the
United States in failing to train or instruct Nikiforow in the necessity of
211 284 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1968).
212 Id. at 716.
213 319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
214 Id. at 702.
215 The Medical Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1976). Section 2651 provides that:
(a) In any case in which the United States is authorized or required to furnish hospital,
medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment (including prostheses and medical appliances)
to a person who is injured or suffers a disease... under circumstances creating a tort liabil-
ity upon some third person (other than or in addition to the United States and except employ-
ers of seamen treated under the provisions of Section 249 of this title) to pay damages
therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover from said third person the reasonable
value of the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right be
subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or diseased person, his guardian, personal
representative, estate, dependents, or survivors has against such third person to the extent of
the reasonable value of the care and treatment as furnished or to be furnished ......
216 Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. at 699.
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an inspection preliminary to towing.2 17 Furthermore, the district court
continued, when the Coast Guard undertook to free the vessel from the
sandy bottom in return for the execution of a waiver of liability, an
admiralty contract was formed. "Under this contract the Coast Guard
impliedly warranted it would perform its service in a careful, safe and
seamanlike manner . . . . Having breached this implied warranty,
which directly resulted in defendant's liability to the plaintiff, defend-
ant is entitled to full indemnity from the United States.
218
Following Nikforow, two actions were brought in the district
courts for breach of implied warranty and product liability. Both were
brought in 1971, one in the Southern District of Alabama and the other
in the Western District of Pennsylvania. In the first, Dudley v. Bayou
Fabricators,219 the court was unequivocal in stating that an action to
recover damages for breach of implied warranty in the sale of a vessel
and for her negligent construction were not within admiralty jurisdic-
tion.2 ° It did, however, grant relief in tort, and stated:
There is ample authority-all of recent vintage-that a products liability
action predicated on negligence will lie in admiralty .... Whether the
action be called products liability, breach of implied warranty sounding
in tort or tort on navigable waters, if the action is based on a negligent act
or omission by the manufacturer or builder that is the proximate cause of
subsequent personal or property injury, liability attaches and is actionable
under admiralty.
221
One of the cases "of recent vintage" that Dudley cited was the
Western Pennsylvania District Court's decision in Ohio Barge Line v.
Dravo Corp.22 2 The court in Ohio Barge tied recovery under the theory
of products liability to "the modem concept which permits implied
warranty to fly the colors of tort, rather than contract, and sail into the
admiralty harbor.
'223
The plaintiff corporation in this action was seeking indemnifica-
tion from defendants Dravo Corp. and Westinghouse Air Brake Co.
for damages it was forced to pay to Delta Concrete Co. when the M/V
Steel Express, a towboat it had purchased from the defendants, went
out of control and struck several barges and the landing to which they
were moored. Ohio Barge Lines also asserted a claim against the de-
217 Id. at 701.
218 Id. at 702.
219 330 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
220 Id. at 790-91.
221 Id. at 791.
222 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
223 Id. at 866.
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fendants for repairs to the Steel Express.
224
District Judge Weis, speaking for the court and quoting at length
from Swift, held that admiralty could determine, by utilizing pendent
jurisdiction, the claim for indemnification even though Ohio Barge




Courts have also begun to grant declaratory relief to petitioners in
admiralty actions, but not without considerable disagreement among
themselves. In 1960, the District Court for the Northern District of
California, Southern Division, citing the Suits in Admiralty Act, sec-
tion 3,226 held in States Marine Lines v. United States227 that declara-
tory judgment proceedings are not available in admiralty. Again, in
1968, a district court, this time for the Southern District of New York,
held that a declaratory judgment was not available in admiralty ac-
tions. The case was American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Manor Investment Co 228
Insurance Co. of North America v. Langan Construction Co.229 was
decided in 1971 by the District Court for the Southern District of Ala-
bama. The court in that case took issue with both States Marine and
American Manufacturers and held that actions seeking declaratory
judgments on marine insurance policies are within the purview of ad-
miralty jurisdiction.230 Chief Judge Daniel Halcombe Thomas noted:
Prior to 1961, it had been held that Admiralty could not grant declaratory
relief [citing States Marine] .... In 1961, the Supreme Court remedied
the situation by adopting General Admiralty Rule 59 which authorized
declaratory relief in appropriate Admiralty cases. . . . Admiralty Rule
59 was rescinded in 1966 with the unification of Admiralty and Civil pro-
cedure and was replaced by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.23'
Judge Thomas continued:
224 Id. at 864-65.
225 Id. at 868.
226 Section 3 of the Suits in Admiralty Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[s]uch [admiralty]
suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according to the principles of law and to the
rules of practice obtaining in like cases between private parties." Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, § 3,
41 Stat. 525, 526, cod#Fedat 46 U.S.C. § 743 (1976).
227 196 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
228 286 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
229 327 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
230 Id. at 567-68.
231 Id. at 567.
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The defendant does cite a 1968 case that unequivocally states that an ad-
miralty court cannot grant declaratory relief (American Manufacturer's
Mutual Company v. Manor Investment Co .... .) but this Court specifi-
cally rejects that Court's holding. . . . The only authority cited by the
New York District Court [In American Manufacturer's Mutual] for its po-
sition was the pre-Admiralty Rule 59 case of States Marine ... .
IV. PINO AND THE HOPES FOR A BRIGHTER DAY
The cases subsequent to the 1966 unification reveal an interesting
and often times confused approach to the exercise of equitable powers
of an admiralty court. While some courts have relied on Swift and
Vaughan-together with the amended federal rules-in holding courts
of admiralty empowered to grant equitable relief, there are no instances
in which equitable relief was awarded in conjunction with an in-
dependent maritime claim until 1979. In that year, the First Circuit in
Pino v. Protection Maritime Insurance Co.233 upheld the decision made
in admiralty to enjoin a maritime tort.
Here, seaman Pino and others brought an admiralty action against
the defendant insurer in order to seek recovery for a wrongful or tor-
tious interference with their seagoing employment relationships. The
district court awarded interim injunctive relief enjoining, as such, the
insurer from charging any added premium to the owner of any com-
mercial fishing vessel simply because he had signed on as a member of
a crew one or more of the plaintiffs.234 On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding that the action was
within the court's grant of admiralty jurisdiction and that acting within
such jurisdiction, injunctive relief could be awarded.235 The court spe-
cifically declared:
We hold, with the question now before us, that courts sitting in admi-
ralty may award injunctive relief in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 in
situations where such relief would be appropriate on land. This is a de-
parture from the traditional rule, but we find no constitutional, statutory
or policy reasons of substance for recognizing a continued limitation upon
the power of federal courts sitting in admiralty, nor does it seem likely
that the Supreme Court would today adhere to the traditional rule.2 36
232 Id. at 567-68.
233 599 F.2d 10 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
234 Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 210 (D. Mass. 1978), afl'd in part and
remanded in part, 599 F.2d 10 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
235 Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d at 16.
236 Id. Circuit Judge John R. Brown noted in Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/VNili that "[t]he
melding of the civil with admiralty ... invests the [judge] with all the applicable statutory pow-
ers, whether their genesis be formerly at law, in equity, or in admiralty." 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th
Cir. 1969). See also supra note 68.
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While the court did rely on Swf, Vaughan, and the unification
when making its decision, it should be noted that a heavy emphasis was
placed on Lewis v. S.S. Baune, a Fifth Circuit decision which had held
that district courts could grant injunctive relief under rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.237 In Pino, the defendants distin-
guished Lewis as a case where "injunctive relief was awarded on a
claim ancillary to the maritime claim that formed the basis of jurisdic-
tion. ' 238 The Pino court was quick in its negation of this point by stat-
ing that "the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the issue did not distinguish
between injunctive relief for admiralty claims and such relief for claims
heard in admiralty by virtue of the court's ancillary jurisdiction. 239
The request for injunctive relief in Pino did not involve a pendent
or ancillary issue. Thus, the case allowed the First Circuit to address
the question whether federal courts sitting in admiralty have equity ju-
risdiction over independent maritime claims. In responding affirma-
tively to this question, the First Circuit has structured a valuable
precedent. One recent Fifth Circuit case, Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The
Un/dent/fed Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,240 has utilized Pino
as a basis for its analysis. And, in fact, it could be said that the "Pino
acknowledgement" of admiralty's injunctive power was underscored.
In Treasure Salvors, a salvage unit was instituted in order to ob-
tain an injunction to prevent rival salvors from conducting any salvage
operations in an area of some 2,500 yards on either side of a line drawn
between points contained in the description of the wreck site. A pre-
liminary injunction was granted. 4  On appeal, it was held by Circuit
Judge Randall that although the district court had not abused its dis-
cretion in entering judgment, a modification of the injunction as to its
duration would be set.242 The court noted the presumption that-prior
to the unification of the admiralty rules with the federal civil rules-an
admiralty judge lacked the power of a chancellor to order injunctive
relief.2 43 However, the court went on to conclude that since the 1966
unification, the admiralty rules have authorized equitable relief, in the
form of an injunction, to be granted by a federal court sitting in admi-
237 Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d at 15, citing Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1976).
238 Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d at 15.
239 Id.
240 640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1981).
241 See id. at 564.
242 Id. at 570.
243 Id. at 564-65.
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ralty.244 In order to sustain this proposition, the court cited Lewis and
Pino.245 Finally, the court held, "When such relief is ordered in the
course of a proceeding within the court's admiralty jurisdiction we see
no legal, or logical or policy obstacle to permitting interlocutory ap-
peals of such orders .. ,246
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's refusal to grant the defendant's petition for
certiorari in Pino has left the circuit courts with confficting rules and
approaches to problem-solving in this area.247 The rationale for Pino's
holding is admirable and, at the same time, reasonable. A plaintiff
should have the same remedies available to him if his case is in admi-
ralty as he would if it were not. As has been shown, there is a sufficient
bulk of decisional law, together with sound and persuasive reasoning,
regarding the accomodation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
order to allow equitable remedies to be recognized which, if acted
upon, can go far to resolve the present turmoil.248 A uniform approach
will be lacking among both the district and the appellate courts until
the United States Supreme Court says but the word to heal the heavy
and confused souls in the federal judicial system.
Complete equity-in its most basic designation, Justice-should
be available to all manner and nature of claims submitted in Admi-
ralty. Absent a strong posture by the Supreme Court by a total and
final reversal of the "Schoenamsgruber Doctrine" 24 9 or a ready accept-
ance of the "Pino Acknowledgement,"25 or both, the federal courts
must assert their fundamental mission as judicial organizations to both
promote and to render full justice. As such, procedure must always be
the handmaiden to justice-and never viewed as an uncompromising
mistress!
244 Id. at 565.
245 Id. at 565 n.3.
246 Id. at 565.
247 Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 444 U.S. 900 (1979) (denial of certiorari).
248 See supra text accompanying notes 233-46.
249 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
